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Abstract. Cloud computing inherits all the systems, networks as well as Web Services’ security vulnerabilities, in particular
for software as a service (SaaS), where business applications or services are provided over the Cloud as Web Service (WS).
Hence, WS-based applications must be protected against loss of integrity, confidentiality and availability when they are
deployed over to the Cloud environment. Many existing IDP systems address only attacks mostly occurring at PaaS and
IaaS. In this paper, we present our fuzzy association rule-based (FAR) and fuzzy associative pattern-based (FAP) intrusion
detection and prevention (IDP) systems in defending against WS attacks at the SaaS level. Our experimental results have
validated the capabilities of these two IDP systems in terms of detection of known attacks and prediction of new variant attacks
with accuracy close to 100%. For each transaction transacted over the Cloud platform, detection, prevention or prediction is
carried out in less than five seconds. For load and volume testing on the SaaS where the system is under stress (at a work load
of 5000 concurrent users submitting normal, suspicious and malicious transactions over a time interval of 300 seconds), the
FAR IDP system provides close to 95% service availability to normal transactions. Future work involves determining more
quality attributes besides service availability, such as latency, throughput and accountability for a more trustworthy SaaS.
Keywords: Intrusion detection, intrusion prevention, software as a service, fuzzy association rule, web service
1. Introduction
Cloud computing, as defined by the National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology (NIST) of the
US Department of Commerce [18], is a model for
enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network
access to a shared pool of configurable computing
resources such as networks, servers, storage, appli-
1The corresponding author was a former faculty at Universiti
Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia when the research was conducted.
∗Corresponding author. Chien-Sing Lee, Faculty of Sci-
ence and Technology, Sunway University, Sunway City,
47500 Selangor, Malaysia. Tel.: +60 3 74918622; E-mail:
chiensingl@sunway.edu.my.
cations, and services, that can be rapidly provisioned
and released with minimal management effort or
service provider interaction. This Cloud model is
composed of three service models, namely, Software
as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS).
Under this Cloud model, at the PaaS layer, plat-
form is provided for the deployed applications and
possibly configuration settings for the application
hosting environment. The provision for processing,
storage, networks, and other fundamental computing
resources for the deployed applications is the capa-
bility of the IaaS. What is promised at the SaaS layer
is that the consumer is able to use the provider’s
1064-1246/16/$35.00 © 2016 – IOS Press and the authors. All rights reserved
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applications running on a cloud infra-structure on-
demand. At all these three layers, consumers are
provided with the services on a pay-per-use basis
hence benefiting from cost savings in terms of
resources being shared and less effort spent on man-
agement of these resources.
However, along with these benefits are security
issues because Cloud computing inherits all the sys-
tems, networks as well as Web Services’ security
vulnerabilities, in particular for SaaS, where busi-
ness applications or services are provided over the
Cloud as Web Services (WS). As mentioned in [27]
that the concerns about data security and trust have
become a significant barrier for many organizations
to adopt SaaS as a solution. Many organizations or
users feel fear of data leakage and loss of privacy
through the use of SaaS over the Cloud platform.
Hence, Web and WS-based applications, such as
e-commerce applications must be protected against
loss of integrity, confidentiality and availability when
they are deployed over to the Cloud environment, be it
over the private, public, community or hybrid Clouds,
as Software as a Service (SaaS).
Recently, vigorous research has been carried out
to find solutions to counter vulnerabilities and attack
found in SaaS, PaaS and IaaS. Due to the dis-
tributed nature of the Cloud environment, attacks
such as Denial of Service (DoS) which are distributed
(DDoS), HTTP and XML-based DDoS are found to
be more destructive than the traditional DDoS [23].
These research have found that traditional firewalls,
network intrusion detection and prevention (IDP) sys-
tems are not adequate to defend against DDoS, XML-
DoS and HTTP-DoS attacks. Moreover, Web and
WS-based applications are vulnerable to attacks such
as SOAP oversized payloads, coercive parsing, SQL
injection and XML injections that could not be effec-
tively and efficiently defended against by network
intrusion detection and prevention systems. Web and
WS-based applications deployed over the Cloud envi-
ronment as SaaS, therefore, require another line of
defense at the application level to counter measure
against XML and SOAP related attacks.
According to [22], firewalls are used as entry points
for the Cloud and client servers. As such, the number
of HTTP or SOAP requests and responses could be
tracked. The average response time for each request is
then calculated. Experimental results show that as the
number of HTTP and XML-DDoS attacks increases,
the load balancer has to distribute the load to more
instances, thus incurring additional cost for the extra
instances.
In our prior research [9], we have developed IDP
systems incorporated within an e-commerce applica-
tion deployed over a network environment, one based
on 20 fuzzy association rules (FAR) and the other
based on 336 fuzzy associative patterns (FAP), to
effectively and efficiently defend against WS attacks
in close to real-time with detection rate of greater than
99%. In this paper, we extend our investigation on
the use of fuzzy logic, associative pattern matching
and association rules for the detection and preven-
tion of existing attacks (signature-based) as well as
prediction of new attacks (anomaly-based) to a WS-
based e-commerce application deployed over a Public
Cloud as SaaS. Our research question is whether our
IDP systems, (FAR and FAP), are able to effectively
and efficiently protect the SaaS against WS attacks
over the Cloud environment? If yes, how will FAR
and FAP perform in terms of detection rate, transac-
tion time and load balancing?
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives
an overview of related work, Section 3 describes the
IDP system and deployment of the IDP system over
the Cloud platform, Section 4 presents testing and
performance evaluation results, Section 5 compares
FAR IDP’s performance with other IDP systems and
Section 6 concludes and discusses future work.
2. Related work
Many businesses have realized the benefits of
Cloud computing technology which allows them
to gain fast access to software or deploy applica-
tions over the Cloud environment without drastically
changing or managing their platform and infra-
structure resources with negligible cost. However,
security remains the main hurdle for the wide
acceptance of Cloud computing technology. Many
enterprises still feel reluctant to deploy their busi-
ness applications and services to the Cloud platform
due to complications in protecting the confidential-
ity, integrity and availability of information and data
transmitted across the Clouds. Security vulnerability
occurs at three service delivery models, i.e., SaaS,
PaaS and IaaS. Therefore in recent years, vigorous
research have been carried out to address the secu-
rity vulnerabilities inherent mainly in PaaS and IaaS
independently.
While PaaS and IaaS inherit mainly the systems
and networks’ vulnerabilities, intrusion detection
research has focused on addressing HTTP anomalies,
HTTP-DoS and DDoS using host and network-based
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ID systems. These ID systems are mostly signature-
based (which identify known attacks only), and/or
anomaly-based (which is able to identify new attacks)
and do not address attacks related to WS and XML for
SaaS. Some of these systems for example, make use
of approaches such as Heuristic Semi-Global Align-
ment Approach (HSGAA) to detect DoS attacks;
filtering tree and trace-back techniques to identify
suspicious IP addresses; apriori algorithm to gen-
erate possible new signatures of network attacks;
multi-thread and pre-defined rule set to detect DDoS;
pattern matching and neural network techniques in
detecting Trojan Horse and DoS attacks and so on.
However, these researches have demonstrated their
IDSs’ capabilities theoretically without performance
validation. Table 1a provides further details [5, 7, 12,
17, 19, 23, 25].
There are other research [2–4, 6, 8, 14] that have
demonstrated and validated the capabilities of their
Cloud-based ID systems with satisfactory results in
detecting mainly network DoS and DDoS. These
(Table 1b) however, are not attacks related to WS
and XML. Cloud applications are mainly WS-based.
Intrusion detection and prevention systems for SaaS
should, therefore, provide mechanisms to defend
against XML and SOAP-related attacks such as XML
injections, XML-DoS or DDoS, SOAP oversized
payloads, coercive parsing and so on. As seen from
Table 1a and b, traditional firewalls, network and
host-based ID systems are not adequate to defend
against WS attacks. These intrusion detection and
prevention (IDP) systems are network and host-
based and address the security vulnerability identified
mainly at PaaS and IaaS layers in-dependently from
each other.
The above review shows that there is an urgent need
to provide solutions to reduce, and if possible to erad-
icate entirely, the security challenges found in Cloud
computing. As the challenge with SaaS security is
no different than with any other Web applications
[21], SaaS therefore, requires another line of defense
at the application level to counter-measure against
XML and SOAP-related attacks.
The use of fuzzy logic or fuzzy reasoning in obtain-
ing accurate prediction results have been proven
effective in many researches. For example, research
in [20] has proposed a fuzzy reasoning and the ensem-
ble method to obtain prediction accuracy as high as
96.35%. In another research in [16], a fuzzy logic
based defense mechanism is proposed to dynamically
define rules according to network traffic pattern of the
cloud environment so as to detect malicious pack-
ets to mitigate the DDoS attack with false alarm rate
as low as 0.14%. Research in [24] has proposed the
use of fuzzy association rules in real time detection
of Web Service DoS attack with satisfactory results.
We, therefore, put forward our fuzzy association rule
intrusion detection and prevention (FAR IDP) sys-
tem intended for Web and WS-based applications
to defense against WS and XML-related attacks for
SaaS as well.
Fuzzy logic, unlike Boolean logic which corre-
sponds only to ‘true’ or ‘false’ value, is many-valued
logic whose ‘degree of truth’ ranges between 0 and
1. When input data are quantitative, for example
in our prior work in [10], input size and SOAP
size in bytes, they could be transformed to fuzzy
sets through fuzzification to smooth out the change
between boundaries. These fuzzified attributes are
then mapped to meaningful linguistic labels to carry
out the intrusion detection function.
Subsequently, association rule mining is used for
discovering interesting relations between sets of
fuzzy attributes. In our prior work in [11], detailed
analysis and observation of the fuzzified data sets
have led to the discovery of associative patterns char-
acterized by seven attributes and then the derivation of
fuzzy association rules (refer to Section 3 for further
details of these fuzzy patterns and rules).
Association rule mining is based on the market
basket analysis’s concept of discovering strong rule
through measure of interestingness. For example, if
a customer buys paper and pencil, most likely he
will also buy eraser, thus forming the association rule
{paper, pencil}= > {eraser}. However, how valid or
significant is this rule shall depend on the support and
confidence imposed. If the item-set {paper, eraser,
pencil} has a support of 80%, this means that out of
ten purchases, the item-set appears eight times. If the
rule {paper, pencil}= > {eraser} has a confidence of
99%, this means 99 out of 100 times, the customer
who buys paper and pencil shall also buy eraser. Thus,
a simple rule-of-thumb to identify strong and interest-
ing rule is to check that the support of its consequent
equal to the support of its ante-cedent and achieving
the minimal confidence level.
3. The FAR/FAP IDP system and deployment
in the cloud platform
Our prior work in [11] had led to 336 fuzzy
associative patterns (Table 2) being formed and the
derivation of 20 fuzzy association rules (Table 3) for
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Table 1a
ID/IDP systems addressing networks and systems’ attacks without performance evaluation
No. Approach & Description Performance & Remarks Sourced From
1. Signature apriori Algorithm + Snort
This NIDS uses Snort for detecting network
intrusions, and signature apriori algorithm to generate
new possible signatures. It is able to detect
DoS/DDoS attacks in Cloud offering laaS.
Detection results show low false positive rate and within
reasonable computational cost. But there is no
experimental results to support these theoretical
claims.
[5]
2. Boyer-Moore (BM) algorithm + Rules Set
The IDS uses an improved BM algorithm in a
high-speed network environment to reduce space
complexity by 36% in pattern matching of intrusion
signature.
The improved BM algorithm is tested by Snort which
captures and matches the packets with 274 rules for
Web data among network packets. There is no
performance evaluation results for detection rate.
[7]
3. Heuristic Semi-Global Alignment
Approach(HSGAA)
Cloud IDS and Host-based IDS located at each node
to cooperate with each other to identify local security
violation events. By exchanging audit data using
HSGAA technique to detect attacks at PaaS layer.
The proposed approach is to detect DoS, buffer overflow
and masquerade attacks, not XML related attacks.
Moreover, there is no performance evaluation or
validation results.
[12]
4. Multi-Threaded Model + Rule Set
A multi-threaded Cloud NIDS to handle large flow of
data packets, analyze them against signature base and
a pre-defined rule set for detection of DDOS and XSS.
There is no performance evaluation results to validate its
effectiveness and efficiency. Detection not cover
XML related attacks and there is no discussion on
prevention.
[17]
5. Single Controller + Neural Network
The IDS uses a single controller to manage instances.
The controller query the Knowledge based (KB)
where patterns of user’s profile are stored. The KB
uses neural network to learn new patterns for detection
of access right violation, Trojan Horse and DoS.
A NIDS in a distributed Cloud computing environment
for detection of non XML related attacks. There is no
performance evaluation results also.
[19]
6. Filtering Tree + Trace Back
The approach uses ftltering tree technique to filter
suspicious IP addresses. Suspicious IP addresses are
stored in a Trace-Back module. A Cloud Defender
then detects for HTTP or XML DDoS attacks.
The approach focuses on detection of Cloud API
vulnerabilities, e.g. SOAP coercive parsing. HTTP
and XML DDoS attacks. No preventive measure being
mentioned and no performance evaluation results.
[23]
7. Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) + VM Intrusion
deteCTOR (VICTOR)
The proposed technique is to differentiate attack
traffic originating from each virtual machine even if
multiple virtual machines on a VMM are sharing a
single IP address. VICTOR is to identify and isolate
the compromised VM that is generating the attack
flow.
Demonstrated techniques for securing virtual machines
from DDoS and worms attacks in laaS. No
performance results to validate the effectiveness and
efficiency of the proposed techniques.
[25]
the evaluation of incoming patterns. The capability
of the fuzzy association rule-based (FAR) model has
been tested and proven to be able to achieve nearly
100% detection and prediction rate with less than 1%
false alarm. Experiments conducted using random
forest as classifier has shown that the FAR model
is able to achieve small Root Mean Square Error
(RMSE) of 0.02 with time to build model within 0.02
seconds for each data set based on a sample size of
greater than 600 test records.
In our more recent work in [9], we incorporated
the 20 fuzzy association rules at one instance and
336 fuzzy associative patterns in another instance,
within a WS-based e-commerce application. Thus,
two IDP systems, one is the FAR IDP system and
the other the FAP IDP system, are developed. Both
are deployed over a network environment for per-
formance evaluation of effectiveness and efficiency.
Testing results have shown that both IDP systems
are able to determine whether to certainly allow
access for normal transaction, probably deny access
for suspicious transaction or definitely deny access
to transactions containing malicious inputs or XML
content. It is proven through experiments that both
the FAR IDP and FAP IDP systems are able to detect,
prevent and predict Web service attacks such as SQL
injection, XML injection, DoS and SOAP oversized
at close to real-time, detection rate not lower than
99% and a slight difference in terms of transaction
time.
In this research, our WS-based e-commerce
application incorporated with a fuzzy association
rule-based intrusion detection and prevention (FAR
IDP) system and a fuzzy associative pattern-based
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Table 1b
ID/IDP systems addressing attacks at PaaS/IaaS/SaaS with performance evaluation
No. Approach & Description Performance & Remarks Sourced From
1. pre-dEcisioN, advance Decision, lEaRning system
(ENDER)
Use a pre-mark decision method to detect attack
traffic and label the attack. Added decision making
and update method then make another decision about
the possibility of the message not being classified
correctly. The labeled message is then removed before
damage is done.
The IDS detects HTTP-DoS and XML-DoS with 99%
detection accuracy and 1% false positive rate. There is
preventive measure in protecting the victim. However,
technique in the defense against XML injection and
SOAP oversized payload is not discussed.
[2]
2. Cloud trace back + ﬂexible deterministic packet
marking algorithm
The IDS detect DDoS attacks occur at the laaS layer.
The IDS is validated using the DARPA (KDD99) data
set.
Experimental results have shown a 91% detection
accuracy. The IDS does not detect and prevent WS
attacks and does not provide preventive measures in
countering DDoS attacks.
[3]
3. Cooperative Agent + Blocking Rules
This framework consists of IDSs within the Cloud
computing regions to exchange their alerts with each
other. These cooperative agents compute and
determine whether to accept the alerts sent from other
agents. By this way, Dos & DDoS attacks could be
prevented.
For this IDS, the computation time per packet is
0.00006 seconds more and the detection rate is 0.2%
less than that of Snort IDS. However, this cooperative
IDS is able to prevent the Cloud service from single
point of failure attack.
[4]
4. Bayesian algorithm + Snort
This network IDS detects DoS attack and other
network level malicious activities in Cloud offering
laaS. Bayesian algorithm classifies attack by
observing previously stored network events while
Snort detects known attacks.
10% of KDD ’ 99 intrusion detection dataset is used as
training data for Bayesian classifier. The network IDS
is able to obtain a detection rate of 96.00% with less
than 1. 5% false positive rate
[6]
5. n-grams modeling of web requests
The IDS determines normal behavior of the HTTP
requests in training phase. Detection phase identifies
anomalies.
Detection accuracy close to 100% with a false alarm
rate of close to 1%. The IDS detect HTTP anomalies
at the SaaS layer but not for detection of WS attacks.
[8]
6. Severity Analysis + C4.5 Decision Tree Algorithm
An intrusion detection and severity analysis system
deployed at a border node to monitor multiple virtual
machines for the detection of DoS & DDoS attacks
occurring at laaS.
VM specific parameter, frequency of attack is used in
the analysis together with C4.5 algorithm for
classification. Experimental results show detection
rate to be over 90%.
[14]
Table 2
Fuzzy associative patterns
Transaction Time T2 T3
Attributes User ID Password Input values Input size SOAP size XML content Decision
Patterns # 1. Valid Valid 1. Valid Normal Matched Non malicious C Allow
2. Valid Normal Not matched Malicious C Deny
3. Valid Normal Extremely not matched New C Deny
4. Malicious Normal Matched Non malicious C Deny
2. Valid Malicious 5. Malicious Out-of-range Matched Non malicious C Deny
3. Valid New 6. Malicious Extremely out Matched Non malicious C Deny
4. Malicious Valid 7. Malicious Normal Not matched Malicious C Deny
5. Malicious Malicious S. Malicious Out-of-range Not matched Malicious C Deny
6. Malicious New S. Malicious Extremely out Extremely not matched New C Deny
7. Malicious Invalid 10. New Normal Matched Non malicious C Deny
8. New Valid 11. New Out-of-range Matched Non malicious C Deny
9. New Malicious 12. New Extremely out Matched Non malicious C Deny
10 New New 13. New Normal Not matched Malicious C Deny
11 New Invalid 14. New Out-of-range Not matched Malicious C Deny
12 Invalid Malicious 15. New Extremely out Extremely not matched New C Deny
13 Invalid New 16. Invalid Normal Not matched Malicious C Deny
17. Invalid Out-of-range Not matched Malicious C Deny
18. Invalid Extremely out Extremely not matched New C Deny
14 Invalid Invalid 19. Invalid Normal Matched Non malicious P Deny
15 Invalid Valid 20. Invalid Out-of-range Matched Non malicious P Deny
16 Valid Invalid 21. Invalid Extremely out Matched Non malicious P Deny
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Table 3
Fuzzy association rules
Rule No. Attributes Decision
UserID Password Input Values Input Size Soap Size XML Content
1. Valid Valid Valid – Matched – C Allow
2. Valid Valid Valid – – Non Malicious C Allow
3. Valid Valid Valid Normal Matched – C Allow
4. Valid Valid Valid Normal – Non Malicious C Allow
5. Valid Valid Valid – Matched Non Malicious C Allow
S. Valid Valid Valid Normal Matched Non Malicious C Allow
7. Valid Valid Invalid – Matched Non Malicious P Deny
8. Valid Valid Invalid Normal Matched Non Malicious P Deny
9. Valid Valid Invalid Out-of-range Matched Non Malicious P Deny
10. Valid Valid Invalid Extremely-out Matched Non Malicious P Deny
11. Valid Invalid – P Deny
12. Invalid Invalid – P Deny
13. Malicious – – C Deny
14. New – – C Deny
15. – Malicious – C Deny
16. – New – C Deny
17. – – Malicious – C Deny
18. New – C Deny
19. – – – Not-matched Malicious C Deny
20. – – – – Extremely not-matched New C Deny
detection and prevention (FAP IDP) system are
deployed independently over to a public Cloud plat-
form with.NET Framework Version 4.5 [26] for
testing and performance evaluation of effectiveness
and efficiency.
Referring to Fig. 1a, individual desktop, laptop or
mobile phone users and users from different private,
public, community or hybrid Clouds, can access to
our systems through different network mix, such as
wired LAN, wireless or mobile and different browser
mix such as Internet Explorer, Chrome, Firefox,
Pocket IE and Safari. This platform and configura-
tion with different mix of network and browsers form
the basis environment for FAR and FAP IDP systems
performance and load testing.
Referring to Fig. 1b, the Web service-based e-
commerce application with the FAR/FAP IDP system
together with the databases are bundled and deployed
over to the Public Cloud. Users access the application
using Internet through HTTP and the Web service
request or XML message is transmitted through
SOAP. Under this platform and configuration, the
FAR/FAP IDP system is able to perform with very
satisfactory results, such as close to 100% real-time
(within 5 seconds) detection, prevention and pre-
diction of WS attacks and close to 95% service
availability for normal transactions at a work load
of 5000 concurrent users over a time interval of 300
seconds.
4. Performance of FAR/FAP IDP systems in
the cloud platform
Over in the Cloud platform, both the FAR and FAP
IDP systems performed effectively. They detected
and prevented all existing known malicious signa-
tures (There were about three hundred (300) existing
or known malicious signatures listed in appendix D
of [1] that include Web service attacks mentioned ear-
lier), and predicted new or unknown type of attacks
on a real-time basis with low false alarm rate. Table 4
shows five representative examples of normal trans-
action, probably deny access transaction and certainly
deny access transactions.
As for efficiency in terms of time performance,
experiments are set up to capture the transaction time
for each scenario represented in Table 4 for FAR and
FAP IDP systems. Experimental results are then tabu-
lated for further analysis. Section 4.1 provides further
details.
In order to evaluate the performances of these IDP
systems, two different sets of experiments are con-
ducted to observe how the IDP systems behave under
stressed conditions in the Cloud environment, yet able
to carry out detection, prevention and prediction func-
tions. The first set of experiment is to stress testing the
IDP systems with different users’ loads, each trans-
acting within a time constraint in fixed length of time.
Section 4.2 provides further details. The other set of
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a
b
Fig. 1. (a) An overview of access and usage of FAR IDP system deployed over the Cloud platform. (b) FAR/FAP IDP systems deployed
over the Cloud platform.
experiment is to stress testing the IDP systems with
different users’ loads, each transacting with a volume
constraint of a fixed number of transactions with no
restriction in time. Experimental results obtained are
tabulated for further analysis. Section 4.3 provides
further details. Based on the experimental results, it
is observed that there is a slight difference in time
and load performances between the two IDP systems.
Explanation on the differences can be obtained from
Section 4.4.
4.1. FAR IDP vs FAP IDP in transaction time
To determine the efficiency of FAR IDP and for
comparison with the FAP IDP, experiments are set
up to test the performances of five scenarios in which
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Table 4
The five representative scenarios
Case # Input values XML Contents Input Size /SOAP size/
Decision
1Patterns/2Rules matched
1 UserID: gychan
Password: gvchan
Credit Card#:
8642880000825858
3-digitpin: 858
Amount: 999.90
Email:
gaikgaik@gmail.com
<soap:Body><InsertPayment
xmlns = "lhttp://tempuri.
org/"><card>86428800008
25858</card><pin>858</pin>
<payment>999.90</payment>
<email>gaikgaik@gmait.com
</email></InsertPayment>
</soap:Body></soap:Envelope>
Normal transaction
Input size: 43
SOAP size: 406
UserID Valid
Password Valid
Input values Valid
Input size Normal
Soap Size Matched
XML content Non
Malicious
Decision C allow
Pattern Matched: T2P1T3P1
Rule Matched: Rules 1–6
2 UserID: gvchan
Password: Gvchan
Credit Card#: NULL
3-digitpin: NULL
Amount: NULL
Email: NULL
NULL
Invalid password
Input size: NULL
SOAP size: NULL
UserID Valid
Password Invalid
Input values NULL
Input size NULL
Soap Size NULL
XML content NULL
Decision P deny
Pattern Matched:
T2P16T3P1 (Assuming
T3P1 transaction is
normal)
Rule Matched: Rule 11
3 UserID: gychan
Password: ‘hi’ or ‘x’ = ‘x’;
Credit Card#: NULL
3-digitpin: NULL
Amount: NULL
Email: NULL
NULL
SQL Injection
Input size: NULL
SOAP size: NULL
UserID Valid
Password Malicious
Input values NULL
Input size NULL
Soap Size NULL
XML content NULL
Decision C deny
Pattern Matched: T2P2 T3P1
Rule Matched: Rule 15
4 UserID: gychan
Password: gychan
Credit Card#:
8642880000825858
3-digitpin: 858
Amount: 999.90
Email:
abcdefghijklmnopqrstu
vwxyzABCDEFGHIJKL
MNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
12345678901234567890
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuv
wxyzABCDEFGHIJKL
MNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
12345678901234567890
@YAHOO.COM
NULL
Input size overly large:
Buffer Overﬂow
Input size: 179
SOAP size: 542
UserID Vaiid
Password Valid
Input values New
Input size Extremely-out
Soap Size Matched
XML content Non
malicious
Decision C deny
Pattern Matched: T2P1
T3P12
Rule Matched: Rule 18
5 UserID: gychan
Password: gychan
Credit Card#:
8642880000825858
3-digit pin: 858
Amount: 999.90
Email:
gaikgaik@gmail.com
soap:Body><InsertPaymentxm
Ins = "http://tempuri.org/">
<card>1234432112344321
</card><script>alert<"hi")
</script><fool>XSSattack!
</fool><pin>123</pin>
<payment>80.50</payment>
<email>ggggggg@gmail.com
</email></InsertPayment>
</soap:Body></soap:Envelope>
Soap Oversized (XSS)
Input size: 41
SOAP size: 462
UserID Valid
Password Valid
Input values Valid
Input size Normal
Soap Size Not Matched
XML content Malicious
Decision C deny
Pattern Matched: T2P1 T3P2
Rule Matched: Rule 19
1For fuzzy associativa patterns, refer to Table 2. 2For fuzzy association rules, refer to Table 3.
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a
b
Fig. 2. Performances of FAR and FAP IDP Systems.
each scenario corresponds to each case of Table 4
(scenarios 1–5 correspond to cases 1–5 in the same
order). For example, scenario 1 corresponds to case 1
which represents normal transaction. Scenario 2 cor-
responds to case 2 which represents probably denying
access due to invalid password is entered. Scenario
3 corresponds to case 3 which is a certainly deny-
ing access transaction due to SQL injection attack.
Scenario 4 corresponds to case 4 where access is cer-
tainly denied because the input size is too large and
causes a buffer overflow. Scenario 5 corresponds to
case 5 which is a certainly denying access transac-
tion due to SOAP is oversized with malicious XML
content. Each scenario is tested ten times through
the Cloud platform first with fuzzy association rules
(FAR) IDP system then followed by the fuzzy asso-
ciative patterns (FAP) IDP system. These tests are
conducted using a machine with Intel x64-based pro-
cessor (i5-4210 CPU@ 1.7 GHz with 4.00 GB RAM)
through the internet with 10Mbps having Windows
8.1 as operating system with Visual Studios Ultimate
2013 as the test tool running under the Microsoft.NET
Framework Version 4.5.
The performances of each system based on the five
scenarios are shown in Fig. 2 with tabulated results
(Fig. 2a) and graphs (Fig. 2b). As seen from Fig. 2a
that our FAR IDP system performs more efficiently
in which each transaction is completed within three
seconds (Fig. 2a Column 2) with average transac-
tion times ranging from 1.88∼2.51 seconds (Fig. 2a
Column 3). It can be seen that the FAP IDP system
performs less efficiently than our FAR IDP system
whereby each transaction is completed within five
seconds (Fig. 2a Column 4) and the average transac-
tion times ranging from 3.05∼4.12 seconds (Fig. 2a
Column 5). It can be seen from Fig. 2b that the two
systems behave in a similar manner (the two graphs
show similar curves where the gaps between the
curves are the time differences). To further confirm
that a transaction model shall display similar behav-
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Fig. 3. Load test results of FAR and FAP IDP systems.
ior, a transaction model (RXD) with rules and patterns
excluded is incorporated and its performance evalu-
ated. As seen from Fig. 2 (Fig. 2a Columns 6-7 and
Fig. 2b) that RXD’s behavior resembles very closely
to that of FAP IDP’s and it performs slightly better
than FAP IDP system but much less efficiently than
the FAR IDP system. Explanation on why these sys-
tems behave in such a way can be found in Section 4.4.
4.2. Performance of the IDP systems in the
Cloud platform with time constraint
Load or volume testing is conducted with the FAR
and FAP IDP systems in order to obtain the opti-
mum performance or limits of the systems when
performing under different users load over in the
Cloud platform. Experiments are set up with the five
scenarios based on the five cases of Table 4 in the
ratio of 40:15:15:15:15 for each test run. This means
for each user’s load, 40% of the transactions represent
normal transaction, 15% of the transactions represent
invalid user inputs, the next 15% of the transactions
represent malicious inputs, the third 15% of the trans-
actions represent inputs that contain long strings and
the final 15% of the transactions represent transac-
tion with malicious XML content. For each test run,
simulation is performed using the same machine,
operating system, platform and test tool that carried
out performance testing mentioned in Section 4.1 but
with different users’ load of 1000, 3000, 5000, and
7000. Additionally, for each test run and each user’s
load, simulation is carried out in a fixed time frame of
300 seconds only. However in reality, the percentage
for normal transactions would be much higher and
the malicious transactions would be very low such as
1% or less. Moreover, the time frame for voluminous
users transacting over the Cloud platform would not
be limited to only 300 seconds in real-life situation.
Our experiment is set up in this manner so as to dis-
cover how far our FAR and FAP IDP systems can
go when under stress (time constraint) in the Cloud
platform.
From our experiments, it can be seen that in terms
of load or volume under this stressed condition, the
system with fuzzy association rules (FAR) and fuzzy
associative patterns (FAP) behave similarly. Refer to
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Fig. 4. Average transaction time for different users’ load for FAR and FAP IDPs.
Fig. 3a for FAR IDP and Fig. 3c for FAP IDP, it is
found that when the load increases, the percentage for
successful transactions for the 5 scenarios decreases.
For example, for FAR IDP, it can maintain a range
of 91.94∼98.31% (Fig. 3a Columns 2–4) of success-
ful transaction rate at a user’s load of up to 5000.
Beyond the 5000 users’ load, the successful transac-
tion rate decreases sharply (Fig. 3b). Notice also that
there is a slight inconsistency in results at the point
with user’s load of 7000 (Fig. 3a and c, Column 5).
The occurrence of these phenomena may be due to
network or host’s machine resource constraint such
as background processes increase for bottle neck or
backlogs as the number of user’s load increases. As
such, comparison of results, are based on user’s load
of 1000, 3000 and 5000 only. The 5000 user’s load
is set as the point for optimum performance for FAR
IDP. Although behave similarly, the FAP IDP sys-
tem performs less efficiently under the same stressed
condition. For FAP IDP, it can maintain a range of
90.93∼95.05% (Fig. 3c Columns 2–4) of successful
transaction rate at a user’s load of up to 3000 only.
Beyond the 3000 users’ load, the successful transac-
tion rate as expected decreases greatly (Fig. 3d) due
to resource constraint.
It is mentioned in [23] that Cloud hosted Web appli-
cation crashes at approximately 3000 concurrent user
sessions under a DDoS attack in about 20 minutes.
Our experimental results as mentioned above has
proven that even with a work load of 5000 concurrent
users submitting transactions with some of the trans-
actions being malicious or suspiciously malicious
within 300 seconds, our FAR IDP system can still
perform and normal transactions are protected against
attacks with a success rate of close to 95%. In other
words, the WS-based e-commerce application incor-
porated with our FAR IDP system and deployed in
the Cloud platform as SaaS is being protected against
DDoS and yet providing 95% availability service for
normal transactions.
More experiments have been conducted to further
observe the behavior of the system with the fuzzy
association rules and fuzzy associative patterns. Refer
to Fig. 4, it is observed that the system with FAR and
FAP exhibit similar behavior. When the user’s load
increases, the average transaction time also increases,
obviously due to race condition where increasing
the load without increasing the processing speed for
example. However, the average transaction time for
user’s load for FAR still perform faster than that of
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Fig. 5. Successful transaction rates for different users’ load for FAR/FAP IDPs.
the FAP. For example, for scenario 1 which is the
normal transaction, the average transaction time for
FAR user’s load of 1000, 3000 and 5000 range from
31.97, 76.87 and 120.82 seconds (Fig. 4a, Columns
2–4) whereas for FAP, the range is from 80.39, 111.86
and 133.39 seconds (Fig. 4c, Columns 2–4). Since
under this stressed condition, the FAP can only take
up a user’s load of up to 3000, this means there is
a close to 35∼48.5 seconds difference in average
transaction time between FAR and FAP for users’
load of 3000 and 1000. Similarly for other scenar-
ios, there are significant time gaps between the FAR
IDP (Fig. 4a and b) and the FAP IDP (Fig. 4c and d).
This further confirms the exhibited behavior as shown
in Fig. 2 that the transaction time performance of
FAR IDP system exceeds that of the FAP IDP system
whether per user’s load or per 1000 and 3000 users’
load.
4.3. Performance of the IDP systems in the cloud
platform with volume constraint
Further experiments are designed to test and evalu-
ate the performances of the FAR and FAP IDPs and at
the same time checking the consistency of the testing
tool in the specific network environment and Cloud
platform. Instead of limiting the time frame for differ-
ent users’ loads transacting over the Cloud platform
to be 300 seconds only, we use flexible time frame
but maximize the transaction volumes to be 2,500
(based on observation from experiments in Section
4.2) for each test run. Again the five representative
cases of Table 4 are used in the experiments. Results
from these testing are summarized and tabulated as
shown in Fig. 5. As shown in Fig. 5 that both FAR
and FAP IDP systems behave similarly but with time
differences as well. Referring to Fig. 5 (Fig. 5a and
b Row 3, Fig. 5c) for both FAR and FAP IDP sys-
tems, the average successful transaction rates drop
gradually from users’ load of 500, 1000 and 1,500
but the drops are significant beyond the user loads of
2000. One obvious reason of cause with 2000 user’s
load carrying out 2,500 transactions with the same
resources as with 500 user’s load is four times more
stressed, hence the great degradation of successful
transaction rate. This may indicate that the perfor-
mance of FAP and FAR IDP systems are optimum
in the load of 500 users carrying out a maximum of
2,500 transactions in more or less than 15 minutes
(Fig. 5b Column 2 and Fig. 5a Column 2).
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a
b
Fig. 6. (a) Transaction flow of FAR IDP system. (b) Transaction flow of FAP IDP system.
A point to note again is that our FAR IDP system
consistently performs better than the FAP IDP system
in terms of successful transaction rates for almost all
the scenarios and all users’ load (Fig. 5a and b, Row
2). In terms of time performance, the FAR IDP system
also performs better than the FAP IDP system (Fig. 5a
and b Row 4, Fig. 5d) for each user’s load.
4.4. Behaviors of FAR and FAP IDP systems in
the cloud environment
It is observed from this research and from our prior
research [9] that both FAR IDP and FAP IDP sys-
tems behave similarly, in terms of time performance,
whether they are deployed in the Cloud environment
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or as standalone systems in the network environment.
As indicated from this prior work, the FAR IDP sys-
tem performs many folds faster, in milliseconds (ms)
than the FAP IDP system. This is consistent with our
results as shown in Fig. 2 in Section 4.1, where the gap
of the curves between FAR IDP system and FAP IDP
system has a time difference of about 2 seconds. This
indicates that FAP IDP system performs slower than
FAR IDP system in all the five representative sce-
narios under the Cloud environment. This difference
is further confirmed by more test results as shown in
Sections 4.2-4.3. The difference in efficiency between
the FAR IDP and FAP IDP systems can be explained
by referring to Fig. 6a, transaction flow of the FAR
IDP system and Fig. 6b, transaction flow of the FAP
IDP system.
For the FAR IDP system, refers to Fig. 6a, the
decision whether to allow access, probably deny or
definitely deny access is instantaneous at the point
when the rules are matched (Fig. 6a, sequence flows
at Time T2:12a, b, or c and at Time T3:20a, b or
c). However, for FAP IDP, the decision for allow-
ing access, probably denying or certainly denying
access is delayed until the whole transaction flow
is completed at Time T3 only (Fig. 6b, sequence
flows at Time T3:20a, b or c). This delay is partic-
ularly obvious for transaction with invalid password
or UserID (Table 4: Case 2 Columns 4-5) and trans-
action with malicious password or UserID (Table 4:
Case 3 Columns 4-5). For these two cases, transac-
tion flows continue from Time T2 to Time T3 even
though the inputs are validated to be invalid or mali-
cious due to the fact that the whole fuzzy associative
patterns can only be formed and matched with the
right decision at Time T3.
Similarly for other transactions where decision is
made at Time T3 (Table 4 Cases 1, 4 and 5) when
inputs and XML content are validated to be normal,
malicious or with extremely large input or SOAP
sizes, the FAR IDP still performs better than the FAP
IDP in terms of efficiency for the same reason. Addi-
tionally for the later three cases, the FAP IDP has to
carry out the process of building and forming fuzzy
associative patterns throughout Time T2 and Time
T3 and when the full pattern is formed then only
match with one of the 336 patterns to determine a
final decision whether to grant access, probably or
certainly deny access for the transaction. This also
explains why the transaction model, RXD follows
closely the transaction flow of the FAP IDP system
but with better efficiency as it does not have to build
and form associative patterns in order to make the
decision whether to grant or deny access. Thus the 20
fuzzy association rules are more efficient in covering
all the 336 fuzzy associative patterns.
5. Comparison of FAR IDP system with other
systems
Many existing ID and IDP systems have demon-
strated their capabilities in the detection and
prevention of attacks occur in Clouds providing SaaS,
IaaS, and PaaS. Referring to Table 1b, for example,
the network ID system proposed by [6] has demon-
strated its capability of detecting DoS attack and other
network level malicious activities in Cloud offering
IaaS with a detection accuracy of 96% with less than
1.5% false positive rate. Experimental results of the
ID system proposed by [3] have shown a 91% detec-
tion rate for DDoS attacks occur at the IaaS layer. The
IDS proposed by [2] is able to detect HTTP-DoS and
XML-DoS with 99% detection accuracy and 1% false
positive rate. Research in [14] has proposed an intru-
sion detection and severity analysis system deployed
at a border node to monitor multiple virtual machines
for the detection of DoS and DDoS attacks occurring
at IaaS with detection rate of over 90%. With a detec-
tion accuracy of close to 100% and a false alarm rate
of close to 1%, the ID system proposed by [8] is able
to detect HTTP anomalies at the SaaS layer. Research
in [4] has demonstrated that the proposed IDP sys-
tem is able to detect and prevent DoS and DDoS with
97% accuracy. Moreover, with a computation time
per packet which is less than 0.003 seconds, this pro-
posed IDP system is able to prevent the Cloud service
from single point of failure attack.
Nevertheless, these ID and IDP systems are pro-
tecting the Cloud services against attacks such as DoS
and DDoS only. Our FAR IDP system, on the other
hand, not only protects the SaaS against DoS and
DDoS attacks, but also detects and prevents known
Web and WS-based attacks such as SQL injection,
buffer overflow, XML injection, XML-DoS, SOAP
oversized payloads and predict new kind of attacks
with accuracy close to 100% and false alarm rate of
less than 1% on a close to real time basis.
6. Conclusion and future work
As can be seen from our experimental results, both
the FAR IDP and FAP IDP systems were able to
detect, prevent known Web and WS-based attacks
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such as SQL injection, XML injection, buffer over-
flow, XML content manipulation, XML-DoS, SOAP
oversized payloads and predict new variant attacks
on a real time basis with detection accuracy close
to 100%. However, there is a difference in time per-
formance. The FAR IDP system takes about three
seconds while the FAP IDP system takes about five
seconds to perform each normal, suspicious or mali-
cious transaction. However, this is still considered
to be close to real time. For load and volume test-
ing on the SaaS where the system is under stress,
as expected, the FAR IDP system performed better
than the FAP IDP system. Particularly with the stress
work load of 5000 concurrent users submitting mix of
normal, suspicious and malicious transactions over a
time interval of 300 seconds (five minutes), our FAR
IDP system provided close to 95% service availabil-
ity to normal transactions, hence protecting the SaaS
against DoS and DDoS attacks.
Most recent researches have seen the trend in pro-
viding improved quality of services (QoS) for Cloud
computing. For example in [15], a double renting
scheme is proposed to maximize profits with guar-
anteed quality of services. This proposed scheme is
able to effectively guarantee the quality of service of
all requests without great waste of resources. Another
research in [28] proposes an efficient mutual ver-
ifiable provable data possession scheme to protect
data integrity. This proposed scheme is noted for its
efficiency as no bilinear operation is required. An
adaptive framework is proposed in [13] to dynami-
cally monitor QoS metrics and performance measures
in order to ensure compliances to the Service Level
Agreement (SLA). This thus imposes accountability
for Cloud service providers. Our future work, there-
fore, is to determine more quality attributes besides
service availability, such as latency, throughput and
accountability (trust) for a better quality and more
trustworthy SaaS over the Cloud platform.
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